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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Texas Workers’ Compensation Act
The Texas Workers’ Compensation Act,1 like other workers’
compensation acts across the United States, was created for the general
purpose of shielding an otherwise negligent employer from liability to an
employee in tort.2 Simultaneously, the Act relieves the injured employee of
the time, expense, and uncertainty of proving such negligence in court.3 An
employee injured within the scope of employment4 is entitled to
1. See generally TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408 (outlining the application of workers’ compensation
benefits).
2. Mary Quella Kelly, Comment, Workmen’s Compensation and Employer Suability: The Dual-Capacity
Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY’S L.J. 818, 818 (1974).
3. See Davis v. Sinclair Refin. Co., 704 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating the Workers’ Compensation Act relieves the employee of the burden of
proving his employer’s negligence, establishes a recovery amount that would otherwise be uncertain,
and relieves the subscribing employer of certain defenses).
4. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.011 (indicating “course and scope of employment,” for
purposes of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, includes activity that (1) originates in the
employer’s business and (2) “is performed by an employee” engaged in the furtherance of the
employer’s business or affairs).
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compensation benefits regardless of the employer’s fault or the employee’s
contribution to fault.5 However, as a consequence of receiving employment
compensation benefits under the Act, an employee forfeits the common law
right to sue their employer for any negligence that caused the work-related
injury.6
B. Suing Third Parties
Notwithstanding the exclusive remedy as against employers, Texas and
most other states7 allow an employee receiving employment compensation
benefits to sue a third party who caused or is otherwise liable for the workrelated injury.8 As noted by Professor Arthur Larson,9 “it is elementary that
if a stranger’s negligence was the cause of injury to [the] claimant in the
course of employment, the stranger should not be in any degree absolved
of [their] normal obligation to pay damages for such an injury.”10 But what
if the employee’s work-related injury results from an employer’s negligence
in duties that are independent to those of an employer?11
5. See Davis, 704 S.W.2d at 415 (noting abrogation of contributory negligence as an employer’s
defense to tort liability).
6. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a) (“Recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the
exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage or a legal
beneficiary against the employer or an agent or employee of the employer for the death of or a workrelated injury sustained by the employee.”) (emphasis added); see also H. Michael Bagley et al., Workers’
Compensation, 55 MERCER L. REV. 481, 487–88 (2003) (suggesting the exclusive remedy provision is the
linchpin without which such statutory schemes would have no meaningful effect).
7. See generally J.T.W. & P.V.S., Annotation, Workmen’s Compensation: Rights and Remedies Where
Employee Was Injured by a Third Person’s Negligence, 106 A.L.R. 1040 (1937) (showing in several states
receipt of compensation benefits does not prohibit an injured employee from bringing a common law
action against a liable third party).
8. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 417.001(a) (“An employee or legal beneficiary may seek damages
from a third party who is or becomes liable to pay damages for an injury or death that is compensable
under this subtitle and may also pursue a claim for workers’ compensation benefits under this
subtitle.”).
9. Professor Arthur Larson (1910–1993) taught at Duke University School of Law and is best
known for his treatise on the law of workmen’s compensation. Arthur Larson, DUKELAW,
https://web.law.duke.edu/history/faculty/larson/ [https://perma.cc/5EAD-CRHW].
Larson’s
treatise is the preeminent authority cited by many courts on the interplay between dual capacity theory
and workers’ compensation law. See, e.g., Stayton v. Clariant Corp., 10 A.3d 597, 601 (Del. 2010)
(referencing Professor Larson’s treatise regarding the dual persona doctrine).
10. 10 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 110.01 (Matthew
Bender rev. ed. 2020).
11. This is not to be confused with an employer’s negligence in an unrelated transaction, such
as when an employee comes into their employer’s shop on their day off to make a private purchase.
See id. § 113.08 (illustrating states’ application of the dual capacity doctrine). The employee may bring
a negligence action in that scenario since the employment relationship is not implicated in any way. Cf.
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Imagine a hypothetical doctor who owns and operates a private practice,
employing several nurses to assist in its operation.12 One day, a nurse
becomes ill on the job and the doctor gives her medication. Unfortunately,
the medication causes the nurse to go into shock. She becomes hypoxic
from oxygen deprivation and suffers lasting brain damage. Normally, the
nurse could bring a claim against the doctor for medical malpractice since
doctors have a duty of care in treating their patients.13 However, this
hypothetical jurisdiction has a statute that precludes an employee from
recovering in tort against an employer where the employer is a subscriber
under the state’s workers’ compensation scheme.
Should an employer who occupies capacities independent from that of
the employer be allowed to circumvent their liability for such capacities via
the exclusive remedy provision?14 Effectively, the employee would be
forced to choose between protracted litigation with a lesser chance of
recovery,15 or the receipt of potentially insufficient compensation
benefits.16 One could argue that the employee at least tacitly agreed to be
subject to the exclusive remedy as it relates to her employment, but not as

Darensburg v. Tobey, 887 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied) (stating an employee
must have been engaged in or acting pursuant to the employer’s business or affairs when the injury
occurred to fall within the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Act).
12. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 821 (setting forth a hypothetical of a physician-employer treating
his receptionist).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (AM. L. INST. 1965) (stating a professional
is required to render their professional services with the knowledge and skill normally possessed by
others practicing in that profession in the community); Majzoub v. Appling, 95 S.W.3d 432, 436
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (stating a doctor’s duty of care arises from the
consensual nature of the physician-patient relationship); cf. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other
Healers § 183 (2020) (describing a physician’s duty of care towards her patients as both contractual in
nature and as a consequence of public policy).
14. Cf. Kelly, supra note 2, at 821 (“Should any injured employee be denied his common law
tort action when he is injured because of the negligence of his employer when the employer occupies
another capacity?”).
15. See Davis v. Sinclair Refin. Co., 704 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting the workers’ compensation acts take uncertainty of recovery out of the
equation).
16. Cf. Jason Kirkpatrick et al., Texas Workplace Injury Compensation: Analysis, Options, Impact,
TEXANS FOR LAWSUIT REFORM FOUND. 25, 26, 28, https://www.tlrfoundation.com/wp[https://perma.cc/Z894-GC8H]
content/uploads/2019/02/TexasWorkplaceCompensation.pdf
(suggesting, in some cases, a severely injured worker is able to achieve greater recovery through
litigation against a third-party tortfeasor than they would through workers’ compensation benefits).
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to a third-party tortfeasor—even one who happens to be her employer.17
The initial judicial response to this dilemma is known as the “dual capacity”
doctrine.
C. The Dual Capacity Doctrine
Several states developed the dual capacity doctrine as an exception to
the exclusive remedy provisions in state workers’ compensation acts.18
The dual capacity doctrine states,
[A]n employer who is generally immune from tort liability to an employee
injured in a work-related accident may become liable to his employee as a
third-party tortfeasor if he occupies, in addition to his capacity as an employer,
a second capacity that confers upon him obligations independent of those
imposed upon him as an employer.19

The application of the dual capacity doctrine has been limited to special
circumstances by different state courts. Texas courts have uniformly
rejected the doctrine as an exception to the state’s workers’ compensation
act, but the Texas Supreme Court has yet to finally lay it to rest or limit
it to those circumstances where it can be appropriately applied.20
This Comment explores the current landscape of the dual capacity doctrine
in the United States, and whether the dual persona doctrine, a stricter
version of dual capacity theory, could be appropriately applied to hold an
employer liable as a third party under the Texas Workers’ Compensation
Act. But first, it will be instructive to consider the early development and
application of the doctrine by various state and federal courts.

17. Kelly, supra note 2, at 832.
18. California, Illinois, and Ohio were the first states to extensively develop a dual capacity
theory. Note, Workers’ Compensation: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine, 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813, 819
(1980).
19. Kimzey v. Interpace Corp., 694 P.2d 907, 910 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985).
20. Payne v. Galen Hosp. Corp., 28 S.W.3d 15, 20–21 (Tex. 2000) (noting although the appellate
courts have uniformly rejected the dual capacity doctrine, the Texas Supreme Court has not definitively
disapproved of the it as an exception to the exclusive remedy provision under the TWCA).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Inception of the Dual Capacity Doctrine
The dual capacity doctrine had its preeminence in the late 1970s to early
1980s.21 However, the fundamental concepts behind the doctrine first
emerged in the 1952 California Supreme Court case, Duprey v. Shane.22
Iva Duprey, a nurse employed by a chiropractor, suffered a neck injury
while at work and was subsequently treated for that injury by her employer,
Dr. Shane.23 The treatment aggravated her injuries, resulting in further
disability.24 Because the original injury occurred while on the job, Duprey
received workmen’s compensation benefits.25 The question before the
court was whether Dr. Shane could be treated as a third party subject to
liability for aggravating Duprey’s injury notwithstanding the Act’s exclusive
remedy provision.26
In a per curiam opinion, the court likened Dr. Shane’s status to that of
the attending physician of an insurance carrier tasked with treating an
employee’s work-related injury, noting that such a physician, as a third party,
would not be protected from liability for negligent aggravation of an
employee’s injuries.27 “In treating the injury,” the court stated, “Dr. Shane
did not do so because of the employer-employee relationship, but . . . as an
attending doctor . . . .”28 Although California subsequently abrogated the

21. See Note, Workers’ Compensation: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine, supra note 18, at 814 (describing
the advent and early applications of the dual capacity doctrine); 10 LARSON, supra note 10, § 113.01
(“The dual capacity doctrine, in spite of widespread . . . attempts to invoke it as a way to defeat
exclusiveness, flourished in only two states . . . for only a few years . . . .”).
22. See Duprey v. Shane, 249 P.2d 8, 15 (Cal. 1952) (per curiam) (describing the dual nature of
an employer’s liability as a doctor).
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 13.
26. See id. at 13–14 (“The claim of an employee [ . . . ] for compensation does not affect his [or
her] claim or right of action for all damages proximately resulting from [such] injury or death against
any person other than the employer.” (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1952) (current version
at CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852))).
27. Id. at 15.
28. Id.
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dual capacity doctrine by statute in 1982,29 Duprey’s impact on the courts of
other jurisdictions is patent.30
B. Expansion of the Dual Capacity Doctrine
In the 1963 case, Reed v. Steamship Yaka,31 the U.S. Supreme Court used
a dual capacity concept to hold a stevedoring company32 liable for an
employee’s injury notwithstanding the exclusive recovery of workers’
compensation benefits mandated under the Federal Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).33 The defendant stevedoring
company leased the SS Yaka from its owner under a bareboat charter.34
Pursuant to then-existing admiralty law, the lessee was normally subject to
liability for the vessel’s unseaworthiness.35 The employee-plaintiff sued the
ship’s owner after being injured while working on the vessel, and the ship’s
owner sought indemnification from the stevedoring company as lessee.36
The Court determined that the LHWCA was not intended to preempt the
stevedoring company’s independent responsibility to render the vessel
seaworthy during the term of the lease; therefore, the stevedoring company
could be held liable as a third party.37

29. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West 1982) (abolishing dual capacities as a basis for holding
an employer or their employee liable in tort).
30. As of the writing of this Comment, a substantial minority of states have considered the dual
capacity doctrine, including: Oklahoma; Arkansas; California; Alaska; Indiana; Kentucky; Louisiana;
Mississippi; Missouri; New York; North Dakota; Pennsylvania; South Carolina; Tennessee; Texas;
Illinois; Maine; Michigan; New Hampshire; and Ohio. See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation,
Modern Status: “Dual Capacity Doctrine” As Basis for Employee’s Recovery from Employer in Tort, 23 A.L.R. 4th
1151 (1983) (illustrating how state and federal courts contemplated the application of the dual capacity
doctrine to cases involving workplace injuries).
31. Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
32. A stevedore refers to a person “who works at or is responsible for loading and unloading
ships in port.” Stevedore, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
stevedore [https://perma.cc/75F5-G3FE].
33. Reed, 373 U.S. at 415–16; 33 U.S.C. § 905 (2018).
34. The lessee under a bareboat charter has full control and possession of the vessel during the
term of the lease. Id. at 412.
35. Id. at 412–13.
36. Id. at 410–11.
37. See id. at 415 (“[We cannot] ignore the fact that Pan-Atlantic was not only an employer of
longshoremen but was also a bareboat charterer . . . charged with the traditional, absolute, and
nondelegable obligation of seaworthiness which it should not be permitted to avoid.”). The LHWCA
was subsequently amended in 1972 to specifically eliminate a vessel owner’s indemnity action for
unseaworthiness against an employer, but no such prohibition was included as to an employee pursuing
a claim against an employer who owns the vessel outright. Kenneth G. Engerrand & Jonathan A.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 5

590

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:583

III. CURRENT APPLICATION OF DUAL CAPACITY THEORY
A. General Disapproval
Since the late 1980s, a majority of states have restricted or disapproved
of the dual capacity doctrine.38 Notwithstanding its logic, most courts argue
that the dual capacity doctrine goes against state legislatures’ intent to
expressly limit the available exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision.39
Some states, such as California,40 Louisiana,41 and Oklahoma,42 have even
attempted to abrogate the doctrine via statute. However, application of the
dual capacity concept lives on in the fact intensive case law of a minority of
jurisdictions, some of which may be instructive for its limited application to
Texas law. The following section provides an analysis of the applications of
the dual capacity doctrine under select theories of liability—(1) shareholder
liability as owner or occupier of land and (2) corporate successor liability as
manufacturer or designer of a defective product.
B. Liability as Owner or Occupier of Land
It is widely acknowledged that the dual capacity doctrine is generally
inapplicable to hold an employer liable to an injured employee as the owner
or occupier of land.43 Even where courts are willing to consider the dual
Tweedy, A Tedious Balance: Third-Party Claims Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,
10 LOY. MD. L.J. 1, 10 (2011).
38. See John D. Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum Swing
Too Far?, 47 ARK. L. REV. 1, 42 (1994) (acknowledging the majority of jurisdictions have rejected the
dual capacity doctrine).
39. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Kiewit Louisiana Co., 152 So. 3d 909, 919 (La. Ct. App. 2014)
(discussing the Louisiana legislature’s intent for intentional torts to be the only exception to the
exclusive remedy provision under 1976 amendment).
40. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(a) (West 2013) (“[T]he right to recover compensation is . . . the
sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer. The fact
that either the employee or the employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of,
the employee’s industrial injury shall not permit the employee [to sue the employer for damages].”)
(emphasis added).
41. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (“[T]he rights and remedies herein granted to an employee . . .
shall be exclusive of all other rights, remedies, and claims for damages . . . . [I]ncluding any claims that
might arise against his employer . . . under any dual capacity theory or doctrine.”).
42. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 5 (West 2019) (“The rights and remedies granted to an
employee . . . shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee . . . . [T]he remedies
and rights provided by this act shall be exclusive regardless of the multiple roles, capacities, or personas
the employer may be deemed to have.”).
43. See, e.g., Cassani v. City of Detroit, 402 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (per curiam)
(“The great majority of American jurisdictions have held that an employer’s status as a landowner does
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capacity doctrine in the premises liability context, there still needs to be a
showing that the employer clearly stepped outside of its role as employer
and that the injury was work-related.44 The doctrine’s unsuitability in this
context is evident after considering how the duties of a landowner or
landlord to an invitee45 are virtually indistinguishable from the duties of an
employer to provide a safe work environment.46 The 1982 California
appellate case, Royster v. Montanez,47 clearly illustrates this point.48
In Royster, Pronto Drilling, a business owned and operated by the
defendant, Miguel Montanez, employed the plaintiff as a secretary.49
Montanez had requested that the plaintiff, Betsy Royster, come to his home
to assist him in paying a work bill.50 She went to his residence to inquire
about the bill and was injured after stepping into a hole of loose soil on the
property.51 Royster sought to hold Montanez liable not in his capacity as
her employer, but as the property owner.52 Montanez argued that the dual
capacity doctrine was inapplicable to circumvent Royster’s exclusive remedy
mandated under the state’s workers’ compensation scheme.53
In its discussion, the court acknowledged that an employer has a duty to
provide a safe work environment to employees, and that this duty is often
not endow the employer with a second legal persona where the injury to the employee occurs in the
course of employment.”).
44. See Weinstein v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 461, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
hospital-employer liable to employee for a slip-and-fall where employee came to seek treatment at
hospital for prior injury without any contractual obligation to do so and was not on duty when the
injury occurred); cf. Rivers v. Otis Elevator, 996 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (refusing to
hold hospital-employer liable under dual capacity theory for injury employee sustained from elevator
while at work even though elevator was accessible to the general public because her injuries were
predominantly work-related).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“A possessor of land
is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land
whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite
such knowledge or obviousness.”).
46. See Freese v. Consol. Rail Corp., 445 N.E.2d 1110, 1114–15 (Ohio 1983) (stating the city’s
obligations to maintain safe conditions of city streets were not unrelated to or distinct from its
obligation to provide safe work environment for city police officer); see also 10 LARSON, supra note 10,
§ 113.02 (acknowledging how an employer will usually own or occupy premises in connection with the
business).
47. Royster v. Montanez, 184 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
48. Id. at 565–66.
49. Id. at 561.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 563.
53. Id. at 561.
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more stringent than the duty a landowner owes to an invitee.54 Accordingly,
“creating dual capacity liability [under such circumstances] would not
impose on employers a greater obligation to provide safe places of
employment.”55 And as Professor Larson points out, “[i]f every action and
function connected with maintaining the premises could ground a tort suit,
the concept of exclusiveness of remedy would be reduced to
nothingness.”56 Perhaps that is why so many courts are hesitant to apply
dual capacity theory to hold city-employers liable for failing to maintain
public streets and roadways.57 However, there are certain scenarios where
courts have been willing to hold an employer or co-employee liable under a
dual capacity theory, notwithstanding the indistinct nature of the duties
owed by employers and landowners.
1.

Dual Personas of Corporate Shareholders

In LaBelle v. Crepeau,58 the Supreme Court of Maine used the dual capacity
doctrine to hold the shareholder of a corporate employer liable as the
landowner of the premises leased to the corporate employer.59 Crepeau
Motors, Inc., a paint and body shop owned and operated by Raymond
Crepeau, employed the plaintiff, Maurice LaBelle.60 LaBelle was injured
after inhaling paint fumes in the paint shop, which LaBelle argued was
improperly ventilated.61 Crepeau personally owned the building where the
paint shop was located and leased it to the corporation.62 The lower
appellate court held that the state’s workers’ compensation act barred
54. See id. at 566 (emphasizing that violating a California statute requiring employers to provide
a safe work environment may carry criminal penalties).
55. Id. at 565–66.
56. 10 LARSON, supra note 10, § 113.02.
57. See Jones v. Kaiser Indus. Corp., 737 P.2d 771, 777 (Cal. 1987) (explaining how survivors
of the decedent police officer could not maintain their suit against the city because the city’s obligation
to maintain intersections for the benefit of the general public did not create a separate status as a
landowner); Freese v. Consol. Rail Corp., 445 N.E.2d 1110, 1114–15 (Ohio 1983) (finding motorcycle
policeman could not maintain action against city-employer under dual capacity doctrine where city’s
obligation to maintain safe condition of city streets was not unrelated to or distinct from an employer’s
responsibility to provide a safe work environment). But see Quintero v. N.M. Dep’t of Transp.,
242 P.3d 470, 474 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010) (finding exclusive remedy provision did not bar employee
from bringing premises liability action against separate department of government employer for injuries
sustained at a city-owned bus lot on her commute to work).
58. LaBelle v. Crepeau, 593 A.2d 653 (Me. 1991).
59. Id. at 655.
60. Id. at 654.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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LaBelle from bringing the suit.63 However, the Maine Supreme Court
reversed on appeal, arguing that Crepeau was not sued based on his status
as an employer, but rather as a landowner.64
The court distinguished LaBelle from other similar premises liability cases
on the grounds that Crepeau Motors, Inc., as an incorporated business, had
a separate legal status from its main shareholder, Raymond Crepeau.65
“One of the principal benefits offered by the corporate form of
organization,” the court stated, “is limited liability for shareholders.”66
But maintaining limited liability for shareholders necessarily entails
upholding the separate legal status of the corporation.67 Therefore, it makes
little sense to allow a shareholder to reverse pierce the corporate veil68
to receive both the benefits of the exclusive remedy provision and the
limited liability afforded to shareholders.69
This corporation-shareholder distinction is an example of what some
courts and commentators refer to as the “dual persona” doctrine, a stricter
version of dual capacity theory that only applies where (1) the relationship
between the plaintiff’s cause of action and their employment status is purely
incidental; and (2) the employer has a separate legal personality that
generates obligations unrelated to the employer’s status as an employer.70

63. See id. (discussing the trial court’s expansive view of the immunity afforded under Maine’s
workers’ compensation act).
64. See id. at 655 (refusing to extend immunity afforded under the exclusive remedy provision
to corporate shareholder in his capacity as landlord); see also Quinn v. DiPietro, 642 A.2d 1335,
1336–37 (Me. 1994) (declining to extend the dual capacity or persona doctrine solely based on
employer’s ownership of property and where no separate legal entity status is implicated).
65. See LaBelle, 593 A.2d at 655 (describing the power of a corporation to own property, defend
and prosecute court actions, and hire employees in its own right).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine by which a court may disregard the
corporation’s separate legal status to hold its shareholders and officers personally liable for the
corporation’s obligations. Durham v. Accardi, 587 S.W.3d 179, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, no pet.). An example of when veil-piercing may occur is when none of the corporate formalities
have been observed and the corporation is merely operating as a tool or “alter ego” for its shareholders.
Id.
69. See LaBelle, 593 A.2d at 655 (“Incorporation carries benefits as well as burdens; one cannot
claim the benefits without the burdens.” (quoting Lyon v. Barrett, 445 A.2d 1153, 1158 (N.J. 1982)));
10 LARSON, supra note 10, § 113.01 (accepting dual legal personalities created by statute as appropriate
where the statute makes it so).
70. See, e.g., Herbolsheimer v. SMS Holding Co., 608 N.W.2d 487, 493 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(reinforcing the extent to which status and obligations as the employer must be distinct from
recognized dual personality).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 5

594

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:583

In fact, several state courts, such as Michigan,71 Illinois,72 California,73
New Mexico,74 and Oklahoma,75 have similarly recognized a dual persona
exception to hold an otherwise immune shareholder or co-employee
negligently liable as possessor of land. Oklahoma’s recent application of the
dual persona concept is particularly instructive in the shareholder context,
considering the recent overhaul to Oklahoma’s exclusive remedy provision
arguably abrogates any dual capacity or dual persona concept.
2.

When Dual Personas Generate Shareholder Immunity

In Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co.,76 Perry Odom brought a negligence
action against Penske Truck Leasing Co (PTLC), the parent company of his
employer, Penske Logistics, after Odom was injured at work by a trailer
owned by PTLC.77 PTLC argued that Oklahoma’s workers’ compensation
act prohibited actions by employees for negligence against a stockholder of
the corporate employer.78 Oklahoma’s exclusive remedy provision states,
The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of
the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act shall be exclusive of all other
rights and remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next
of kin, or anyone else claiming rights to recovery on behalf of the employee
71. See Bitar v. Wakim, 572 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Mich. 1998) (applying dual capacity to hold the
sole shareholder of a corporate employer liable as a possessor of property leased to the corporate
employer where the employee’s slip-and-fall occurred); cf. Clark v. United Tech. Auto., Inc.,
594 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Mich. 1999) (distinguishing a vertical business entity relationship between a
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, wherein a reverse-piercing analysis may be considered,
from a horizontal business entity relationship, wherein a dual employer analysis ought to apply).
72. See Sobczak v. Flaska, 706 N.E.2d 990, 997 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (stating a co-employee and
owner of the property where the employee’s injury occurred was not immune from premises liability
where he assumed a separate persona of general contractor by supervising employee work done on his
residence).
73. See Miller v. King, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding statutory
abrogation of dual capacity doctrine did not extend immunity to shareholders of a corporate employer
who were also owners of the property where employee was injured).
74. See Salswedel v. Enerpharm, Ltd., 764 P.2d 499, 503 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (acknowledging
the dual persona doctrine and determining an injured employee had standing to bring premises liability
against the corporation her employer had a partnership interest in).
75. See Lind v. Barnes Tag Agency, Inc., 418 P.3d 698, 705 (Okla. 2018) (“A corporation and
its sole owner and shareholder are separate entities and the immunity of the workers’ compensation
laws that shields the corporation from tort liability to employees does not extend to the owner of the
corporation as a third-party landowner.”).
76. Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 415 P.3d 521 (Okla. 2018).
77. Id. at 524–25.
78. Id. at 524.
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against the employer, or any principal, officer, director, employee,
stockholder, partner, or prime contractor of the employer on account of
injury, illness, or death . . . .
No role, capacity, or persona of any employer, principal, officer, director, employee, or
stockholder other than that existing in the role of employer of the employee
shall be relevant for consideration for purposes of this act, and the remedies
and rights provided by this act shall be exclusive regardless of the multiple
roles, capacities, or personas the employer may be deemed to have . . . .79

The Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged that this language
expressly abrogated any dual capacity concept with regard to employers.80
As the court notes, however, the statute’s language regarding stockholder
liability is susceptible to multiple interpretations where the provision
purports to exclude additional remedies against employers and stockholders
alike, but then only abrogates the dual capacities of an employer.81
To further confuse matters, the Arkansas workers’ compensation statute,
which Oklahoma modeled its own exclusive remedy provision on, only
limited stockholder liability when they are “acting in [their] capacity as an
employer.”82 Although the Oklahoma Legislature may have intended to
expand protections afforded to stockholders of the employer,83 to give
them complete immunity in every context would generate absurd
outcomes.84 For example, in the opinion certifying the questions raised in
Odom to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
10th Circuit set forth a hypothetical where a dog injures an employee of a
publicly-traded cable company while the employee installs a customer’s
television cable service.85 However, the client also happens to own a few
shares of stock in the cable company.86 Without any context, the Oklahoma
statute could be read to completely bar the employee from bringing a claim

79. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85A, § 5 (emphasis added).
80. Odom, 415 P.3d at 527.
81. Id. at 528–29.
82. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-105.
83. Odom, 415 P.3d at 529.
84. Id. at 532 (“[A]n interpretation that extends the protections of the exclusivity provision
absolutely to potentially legally distinct non-employer entities such as stockholders, regardless of how
passive their connection to the employment relationship is, goes far beyond that original purpose and
conflicts with later portions of [the exclusive remedy provision].”).
85. Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 704 F. App’x 780, 783 (10th Cir. 2017).
86. Id.
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against the client.87 Since it is doubtful the Oklahoma Legislature intended
such a result, the court argued, the statute’s only reasonable interpretation
is that a stockholder may be shielded from liability as a third party under the
exclusive remedy provision when the stockholder is “acting in the role of
employer,” and not “a mere passive stockholder.”88
This same concept can also be interpreted to extend immunity to a
stockholder acting as a co-employee or other corporate officer, since many
state exclusive remedy provisions prohibit actions for negligence against
both the employer and agents of the corporate employer.89 Ultimately, the
irony in this line of reasoning is that, while most states refuse to
acknowledge the dual capacity doctrine to create employer liability, the
doctrine is statutorily authorized and judicially extended to afford immunity
to shareholders when they act in such dual (or even triple) capacities.90
In theory, these concepts can be applied to the Texas Workers’
Compensation Act without doing any significant harm to the purposes
behind the exclusive remedy provision.91
3.

Applications in Texas

The exclusive remedy provision in the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act
does not expressly prohibit application of any dual capacity or persona
concept as to either an employer or a stockholder.92 In fact, there is one
Texas case which implicitly acknowledged the possibility of a dual persona
scenario in the premises liability context between an employee and

87. Id.
88. Odom, 415 P.3d at 533.
89. See, e.g., TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a) (extending immunity to both employers, their
agents, and co-employees); cf. Miller v. Massullo, 432 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (asserting
co-employee could not maintain WCA immunity where his act of leasing a tractor-trailer to the
company that employed him and injured the employee was outside the scope of his employment for
company); Robards v. Kantzler’s Estate, 296 N.W.2d 265, 267–68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (explaining
how the president of corporate employer could not invoke the WCA exclusive remedy because leasing
machinery which injured the employee to the corporation wasn’t within scope of employment).
90. See, e.g., Jackson v. Gibson, 409 N.E.2d 1236, 1238–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (refusing to
hold sole shareholder of corporate employer liable as owner of land where employee was injured
because shareholder was also president of corporate employer).
91. See Cohn v. Spinks Indus., Inc. 602 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1980, writ ref’d
n.r.e.) (arguing adoption of the dual capacity doctrine would do considerable violence to Texas’
workers’ compensation statute); cf. supra Part IV (explaining why the dual persona doctrine does not
implicate the same concerns as the dual capacity doctrine).
92. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a) (establishing immunity only for employers and their
agents).
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shareholder of the corporate employer,93 so other appellate courts should
find at least some merit in the doctrine’s general applicability to Texas law.
First, Texas courts can easily argue that the corporate form creates a legal
distinction between the corporate employer and its shareholders that
justifies maintaining the independent obligations such shareholders may
have as the owners or possessors of land.94 Absent compelling reasons
otherwise, it makes little sense to allow a shareholder to double-dip in the
trough of limited liability.95 Assuming application of the dual persona
concept under this scenario, the simplest ways shareholders can reduce their
risk of exposure is to not lease property to corporations they have an interest
in or to transfer their ownership in the leased property to the corporation—
thereby consolidating such liability directly in the already-immune corporate
employer. However, this application does not consider the managerial or
co-employee status that some shareholders maintain within a corporate
employer.
The Texas Workers’ Compensation Act does create statutory immunity
for agent and co-employee negligence within the scope of employment.96
Therefore, Texas courts can readily follow the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
analysis and give shareholders immunity under the Workers’ Compensation
Act, assuming they are acting as employers, officers, or co-employees, rather
than as mere passive investors.97 Both the expanded and limited methods
have their merits, and additional Texas courts will undoubtedly illuminate
the better approach as the facts of future cases dictate. But more
importantly, the fact that a dual persona scenario in the shareholder context
93. See Burkett v. Welborn, 42 S.W.3d 282, 288–290 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.)
(acknowledging Texas precedent rejecting the dual capacity doctrine, but allowing employee’s premises
liability claim against a shareholder of the corporate employer to survive summary judgment where the
shareholder owned property upon which the employee was injured and where it was unclear whether
the shareholder had co-employee immunity under TWCA).
94. See LaBelle v. Crepeau, 593 A.2d 653, 655 (Me. 1991) (“[W]e do not ignore the corporate
entity in order to allow a shareholder to avoid the burdens of incorporation.”).
95. Even if there is such “unity between corporation and [an individual shareholder] that the
separateness of the corporation has ceased,” reverse-veil-piercing is not an appropriate remedy absent
an injustice that would otherwise occur—such as fraud or circumvention of a statute. Richard Nugent
& CAO, Inc. v. Estate of Ellickson, 543 S.W.3d 243, 266–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018,
no pet.) (quoting Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986)).
96. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a).
97. Compare Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 415 P.3d 521, 532 (Okla. 2018) (limiting
shareholder liability when acting as employer), and Jackson v. Gibson, 409 N.E.2d 1236, 1238–39
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (limiting shareholder liability when acting as corporate officer), with LAB.
§ 408.001(a) (establishing immunity for co-employees).
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has already been acknowledged by at least one Texas court should only
bolster support for applying the next dual persona addressed in this
Comment—the liability of employers as manufacturers and designers of
defective products.
C. Liability as Designer and Manufacturer of a Defective Product
Any company or person that manufactures or produces a product sold to
the public has the duty to make sure the product is safe for public use and
consumption.98 Generally, if an end-user is injured by an unreasonably
dangerous product that was defectively designed or manufactured, the
manufacturer, suppliers, and dealers may be held strictly liable.99 But what
if the defective product injures an employee of the manufacturer? Just as
with premises liability theory, strict products liability cannot be applied
without jettisoning the workers’ compensation schemes’ exclusive remedy
provision.100 So, a few state courts initially invoked the dual capacity
doctrine to hold an employer liable to an injured employee as manufacturer
of a defective product.101 However, the doctrine’s utility as a work-around
quickly faded as courts and legal scholars acknowledged the same concerns

98. James C. Webber, Dual Capacity in California: A Premature End to An Equitable Doctrine,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (1985).
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (“One who sells
any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.”);
Gina Vaccaro Fulkerson, Comment, Workers’ Compensation: Dual Capacity in Texas—When the Employer
“Wears Two Hats”, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 473, 476–77 (1982) (discussing different parties who may be
held liable for a defective product under strict liability theory); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc.,
377 P.2d 897, 899–901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (discussing the history of strict liability cases for
unwholesome foods and express or implied warranties and extending strict liability to all defectively
made products regardless of privity between the producer and end-user). Note that Texas law departs
from the Second Restatement by limiting strict products liability for manufacturers to inherently unsafe
products and design defects where a safer alternative existed. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.004
(2021) (inherently unsafe products); id. § 82.005(a) (safer alternative design).
100. See Fulkerson, supra note 99, at 477–78 (setting forth hypotheticals highlighting the
inherent conflict between exclusive remedy provisions and strict products liability claims of
employees).
101. See id. at 481–82 (discussing the history of invoking dual capacity theory in products liability
cases).
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that defeated the dual capacity theory in the case of owners and occupiers
of land.102
Dual capacity theory is “not concerned with how separate or different the
second function of the employer is from the first, but whether the second
function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from that of
employer.”103 As noted previously, an employer may have both a duty to
provide a safe work environment to employees and a similar duty to provide
safe premises to invitees as a landowner.104 Analogously, “[i]f an employer
provides an employee with a defective machine or tool to use in his work,
he has breached his duty as a manufacturer to make safe machinery, and his
duty as an employer to provide a safe working environment.”105
But providing the defective product to an employee does not thereby
transform the employer’s obligations to provide a safe workplace into
something else simply because the danger came from a product
manufactured by the employer, rather than some other danger on the
business’s premises.106 Without something more, there is nothing material
to distinguish these duties. Undeterred, a handful of courts found sufficient
justification to distinguish these duties where manufacturers provided their
defective products to employees and also sold those products to the general
public.107 The main thrust of this argument is that manufacturers and
102. See 10 LARSON, supra note 10, § 113.03 (“It is now held with virtual unanimity that an
employer, who is also the manufacturer, modifier, installer, or distributor of a product used in the work,
cannot be held liable in damages to its own employee on a theory of products liability.”).
103. Schump v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 541 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (Ohio 1989) (quoting
Weber v. Armco, Inc., 663 P.2d 1221, 1226–27 (Okla. 1983)).
104. See Hilgart v. 210 Mittel Drive P’ship, 978 N.E.2d 710, 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)
(“As president and vice president of Hilgart’s employer, Leturno’s and Lisowski’s duty was to furnish
Hilgart with a safe place to work, a duty related to the common-law duty of a landowner to provide
safe premises.”).
105. Schump, 541 N.E.2d at 1045.
106. See id. (“[These] two duties are so inextricably wound that they cannot be logically separated
into two distinct legal [capacities or] personas.”).
107. See Estep v. Rieter Auto. N. Am., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 323, 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (refusing
to hold an employer liable where the employer did not manufacture the pinch roller machine for sale
to the general public and employee’s injury by the machine occurred within scope of employment);
see also Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (holding an employee could
pursue a products liability action against the employer in its capacity as a manufacturer of defective
tires on a vehicle, resulting in the employee’s work-related injuries, where the employee’s use of the
employer’s tires was merely a coincidence); Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797,
802–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (applying the dual capacity doctrine to hold an employer liable as
manufacturer of scaffolding sold to the general public where the scaffolding was also used by injured
employees on the job).
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sellers take on special responsibilities when disseminating a product for
general consumption, regardless of any employment relationship.108
However, the Ohio Supreme Court case, Schump v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.,109 explains why this line of reasoning is ultimately flawed.110
1.

Does “Stream of Commerce” Really Matter?

Warren Schump was employed by Firestone Tire & Rubber Company
(Firestone) as a truck driver.111 Schump was injured on the job when one
of the tires on his work truck—manufactured by Firestone—blew out.112
Schump brought suit against Firestone, alleging several theories of products
liability.113 Firestone argued that Schump’s sole remedy was mandatory
employment compensation benefits under Ohio’s workers’ compensation
statute.114 Schump responded that the dual capacity doctrine applied to
hold Firestone liable as the manufacturer of the tires, rather than as his
employer, because Firestone manufactures its product for general
consumption.115 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, recognized the real
issue in this case—whether or not the tires were provided to Schump within
the scope of employment.116
In a similar Ohio case, Mercer v. Uniroyal,117 the plaintiff was employed as
a truck driver by American Stevedoring Corporation (ASC).118 ASC had
an agreement with a tire manufacturer, Uniroyal, whereby ASC would lease
its truck drivers, including the plaintiff, to Uniroyal.119 When the plaintiff
was injured on the job, he and another employee were using a work truck
leased by Uniroyal from a third-party vendor, which happened to be
108. See Fulkerson, supra note 99, at 478 (arguing manufacturers should not be entitled to
assume the benefits of disseminating a product without the adjoining burden of liability simply because
of their relationship to one of the end-users).
109. Schump v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 541 N.E.2d 1040 (Ohio 1989).
110. See id. at 1045 (refusing to hold an employer liable as manufacturer of a defective product
sold both to an employee and the general public).
111. Id. at 1041.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1042.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1045.
117. Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
118. Id. at 493.
119. Id. Although the plaintiff was still technically employed by ASC at the time of the accident,
the court determined that the plaintiff was also an employee of Uniroyal for workers’ compensation
purposes. Id. at 494.
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equipped with defective Uniroyal tires.120 The Mercer court found that the
employee could maintain a products liability action against Uniroyal as the
manufacturer of the defective tires, notwithstanding the exclusive remedy
provision, because “[i]t was only a matter of circumstance that the tire on
the truck . . . was a Uniroyal tire rather than a Sears, Goodyear or
Goodrich.”121 Even the California Legislature acknowledged this
distinction, despite abolishing the dual capacity doctrine, when it made
special license for employer liability where the employer manufactured the
defective product and the product came into the employee’s possession
through a third-party vendor.122
In contrast, the plaintiff’s work truck in Schump was equipped with
Firestone tires per Firestone’s company policy and solely as an incident of
the employment relationship.123 The fact that Firestone also sells tires to
the general public does not change this fact and ultimately has no bearing
on Firestone’s obligations to its employees within the scope of
employment.124 No one would suggest that a manufacturer-employer’s
obligations to an employee magically change if the employer sold only 1%
of its product to outside vendees, so why would it matter if the manufacturer
sold 90% to outside vendees?125 This analysis has not settled the issue,
however, as some courts have found another justification to allow an
employer to be held strictly liable for a defective product via the dual
persona doctrine.

120. Id. at 493, 496.
121. Id. at 496.
122. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b)(3) (“An employee . . . may bring an action at law for damages
against the employer . . . [w]here the employee’s injury or death is proximately caused by a defective
product manufactured by the employer and sold, leased, or otherwise transferred for valuable
consideration to an independent third person, and that product is thereafter provided for the
employee’s use by a third person.”).
123. Schump v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 541 N.E.2d 1040, 1045 (Ohio 1989).
124. See id. (“[W]hat matters is that . . . the product was manufactured as an adjunct of the
business[] and furnished to [the plaintiff] solely as an employee, not as a member of the consuming
public. What the employer does with the rest of his output could not change this central fact.”);
Bakonyi v. Ralston Purina Co., 478 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ohio 1985) (holding employee of pesticide
distributor could not maintain products liability action where the employee’s injuries arose from
“the employment use, not the public sale use”); see also Ocasek v. Krass, 505 N.E.2d 1258, 1260
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (finding a duty to the general public does not, by itself, create or justify separate
personas or capacities).
125. See 10 LARSON, supra note 10, § 113.03 (providing a hypothetical of a scaffolding
manufacturer selling products to the general public and having their employees use the same products).
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Dual Personas of Corporate Successors in Interest

As previously discussed, the dual persona doctrine is a version of dual
capacity theory that allows circumvention of the exclusive remedy provision
mandated under state workers’ compensation schemes when “the employer
has a second identity which is completely distinct and removed from his
status as employer.”126 Similar to the liability some shareholders of a
corporate employer may owe to an employee as the owners or occupiers of
land, the dual persona doctrine can also be utilized to hold an employer
liable as the successor in interest to the manufacturer of a defective product
that injures an employee of the corporate successor.127
There are several methods of one corporation acquiring ownership of
another corporation, including: purchase of a majority of a company’s
stocks; purchase of a company’s assets; and merger of the two
companies.128 These different forms of acquisition can have different
effects on who ends up holding the selling company’s bag of unknown
liabilities.129 When the selling corporation’s stock is purchased, only the
shareholders have changed, and the corporate form of the seller is
preserved.130 The liabilities remain with the selling company but simply
under new ownership.131 If another corporation purchases the selling
company’s assets, the parties will iron out a contract stipulating who will
retain which liabilities.132 Merger of the two corporations results in the
termination of the selling corporation’s existence,133 leaving a single
surviving corporation or the creation of a wholly new corporate entity.134
Contrary to the other forms of acquisition, states statutorily require the
surviving or new corporation to assume the pre-merger liabilities of the

126. Howard v. White, 523 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Mich. 1994) (quoting Wells v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 364 N.W.2d 670, 675 (Mich. 1984)).
127. See, e.g., Gurry v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 550 N.E.2d 127, 131 (Mass. 1990) (holding
corporate employer was not immune from tort liability to employee injured by predecessor
corporation’s manufacture of defective machine where predecessor would have been liable to
employee as third party).
128. Byron F. Egan, Asset Acquisitions: Assuming and Avoiding Liabilities, 116 PENN ST. L. REV.
913, 914 (2012).
129. Id. at 932.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 10.008(a)(1).
134. Id. (explaining termination of corporate existence applies to entities “other than a surviving
or new domestic entity”).
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predecessor corporation.135 There are different theories of corporate
successor liability,136 but this Comment focuses on statutorily mandated
and contractually agreed assumptions of corporate liabilities based on these
general forms of acquisition.
The principal case highlighting corporate successor liability under the
dual persona doctrine is Billy v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corporation.137
In 1976, Joseph Billy was killed on the job when a two-ton section of a
vertical boring mill broke away and fell on him.138 The boring mill was
designed and manufactured in the 1950s by Consolidated Machine Tool
Corporation (Consolidated) and installed by Farrel-Birmingham Company
(Farrel).139 In 1954, Consolidated merged into Farrel.140 In 1968, Farrel
was acquired by and merged into USM, decedent’s employer.141
The plaintiff, decedent’s wife, brought suit against USM in its capacity as
the owner of the property where the decedent’s injury occurred, and as the
successor in interest of Consolidated and Farrel—the companies that
designed, manufactured, and installed the allegedly defective machinery
resulting in Joseph Billy’s death.142 In the trial court, USM moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s suit was barred by
New York’s workers’ compensation statute,143 which limits an employee’s
remedy for work-related injuries to employment compensation benefits.144
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals discussed the history of the
dual capacity doctrine and reasserted New York’s general rejection of the
theory.145 However, the court distinguished Billy on the grounds that the
plaintiff would have been entitled to bring suit against both Consolidated
and Farrel as third parties if they had not merged with the decedent’s

135. See, e.g., id. § 10.008(a)(3) (“When a merger takes effect . . . all liabilities and obligations of
each organization that is a party to the merger are allocated to one or more of the surviving or new
organizations in the manner provided by the plan of merger.”).
136. See Egan, supra note 128, at 934 (discussing the nine different methods of holding a
successor in interest liable for the predecessor’s obligations).
137. Billy v. Consol. Mach. Tool Corp., 412 N.E.2d 934 (N.Y. 1980).
138. Id. at 937.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 937–38.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 938–39.
143. Id. at 937.
144. N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. Law § 11 (McKinney 2020).
145. Billy, 412 N.E.2d at 938–39.
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employer.146 USM conceded that it succeeded to the liabilities of
Consolidated and Farrel via New York’s state merger statute.147 “That
USM also happens to have been the injured party’s employer,” the court
argued, “is not of controlling significance, since the obligation upon which
it is being sued arose not out of the employment relation, but rather out of
an independent business transaction between USM and Farrel.”148 This
line of reasoning has been echoed by several other jurisdictions, including
Kansas, Illinois, and Delaware.149 There are, however, potential limitations
to how far the dual persona doctrine can be stretched in this context.
3.

Immunities of Corporate Successors in Interest

A few courts have determined that the acquisition of one company by
another does not always mean the successor corporation will lose the
employer immunity status generated by the exclusive remedy provision. In
Herbolsheimer v. SMS Holding Company,150 Royce Herbolsheimer was killed
after a piece of metal on the turning machine151 he operated as an employee
for Saginaw Machine Systems (SMS) broke through a modified protective
window and struck him in the head.152 The defective window on the
turning machine had been modified after it was sold to the Saginaw Machine
and Tool Division of the Wickes Corporation (SMT).153 Through a series
of asset transfers and stock purchases, SMT was acquired by SMS Holding

146. See id. at 940 (“Conceptually, the [plaintiff] is suing not the decedent’s former employer,
but rather the successor to the liabilities of the two alleged tort-feasors.”); 10 LARSON, supra note 10,
§ 113.01 (acknowledging corporate successor liability as a viable example of a dual legal personality,
which emphasizes distinctions between dual capacity and dual persona doctrines).
147. See Billy, 412 N.E.2d at 940 (“USM has not seriously disputed that it had succeeded to the
liabilities and obligations of Consolidated and Farrel-Birmingham as a result of the 1968 merger.”).
148. Id.
149. See Kimzey v. Interpace Corp., 694 P.2d 907, 911–12 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing an
employee to proceed in an action against the employer as the successor in interest to the manufacturing
corporation); Robinson v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 525 N.E.2d 1028, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(concluding an exclusive remedy provision did not preclude a tort action by an employee against the
employer when the employer merger with the negligent predecessor prior to employee’s injuries);
Stayton v. Clariant Corp., 10 A.3d 597, 601–603 (Del. 2010) (affirming exclusive remedy under
workers’ compensation act was not designed to preclude third-party tort liability of corporate successor
to employee for defects in modifications made to machinery by the predecessor company).
150. Herbolsheimer v. SMS Holding Co., 608 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
151. A turning machine spins pieces of metal at high rates of speed. Id. at 489.
152. Id. at 489–90.
153. Id. at 490.
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Company, Inc. (the Holding Company) and had its name changed to SMS,
the company that would later hire decedent.154
The plaintiff, as the representative of the decedent’s estate, brought
claims against the Holding Company and SMS as the purported successors
in interest to SMT.155 The Michigan appellate court acknowledged the dual
persona doctrine’s logic in the successor corporation context,156 but it
chose a narrower interpretation requiring further analysis.157
First, the court argued the injured employee needed to have an
independently cognizable claim against the predecessor corporation, as this
creates the basis for the successor corporation’s liability.158 Before SMT
was acquired by the Holding Company, the turning machine was only used
by SMT employees within the scope of employment.159 Therefore, the
court suggested, the only duties SMT could have had regarding the safety of
the modified machine would have been to its own employees.160
Second, the court asserted that the dual persona analysis needs to account
for the immunities the predecessor corporation would have if it was still in
existence at the time of the decedent’s injury.161 If an employee of SMT
had been injured by the defective machine in the same way the decedent
was, SMT would have been entitled to immunity under the exclusive remedy
provision.162 “Thus, the decedent here could not have sued SMT had he
been injured as an employee of SMT, and he was only in a position to be
injured by the machine as an employee of SMS.”163 Although the dissent

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 494–95 (asserting the plaintiff can look to a third party as tortfeasor which
theoretically removes the obstacle of the exclusive remedy provision).
157. See id. at 495 (seeking a narrower interpretation of the dual persona doctrine since it is a
judicial fiction which impedes on the will of the legislature); id. at 496 (“Although plaintiff argues that
‘successor liability’ may form the basis of a dual-persona suit, accepting this idea in theory does not
end the inquiry.”).
158. Id. at 496.
159. Id.
160. Id. Of course, as the dissent points out, it is entirely possible that someone other than an
employee could have been injured by the defective window, such as a visitor to the factory.
Id. at 501 n.6 (Hoekstra, J., dissenting).
161. See Herbolsheimer, 608 N.W.2d at 496 (emphasizing a successor corporation takes on not
just the liabilities of the predecessor, but also its immunities and defenses).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 496–97.
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points out that this argument rings of the previously discredited “stream of
commerce” justification,164 the majority notes that
The idea of introducing goods into the “stream of commerce” is relevant only
insofar as this provides an actual legal claim against the predecessor and
therefore against the successor in liability under the facts in a specific case.
Thus, in this case, there would be an identifiable legal obligation if SMT had
sold or leased the machine to SMS, where the decedent was killed by it.
In that case, although the decedent was employed by SMS, who was also the
successor in liability to SMT, SMT would have had legal obligations to the
buyers or lessors of its machine that could be separated from the obligations
of SMS as the employer.165

Although the dissent cites this as a weak factual distinction,166 it has
found traction in a few other jurisdictions who have limited the dual persona
doctrine under similar reasoning.167 Therefore, there are ultimately two
approaches to the dual persona version of dual capacity theory that can be
applied to hold a successor corporation liable to an employee under Texas
law.
4.

Applications in Texas

When a Texas corporation assumes the liabilities of a predecessor
corporation, either via statutory merger or agreement, it is clear that the
successor’s employee should not be barred from pursuing a cause of action
against the employer in its persona as successor in interest to the
predecessor for a defectively designed or manufactured product that injures

164. See id. at 498, 500 (Hoekstra, J., dissenting) (“[The majority essentially] argues that goods
cannot be the source of [dual persona] liability unless the predecessor corporation manufactured them
for resale.”).
165. Id. at 497.
166. What meaningful distinction exists between sale of the defective product during the merger
as opposed to a sale prior to it? Id. at 501 (Hoekstra, J., dissenting). The successor ends up holding
the bag of liabilities nonetheless, and this factual distinction becomes potentially untenable. See id.
at 500 (Hoekstra, J., dissenting) (“Unfortunately, ambiguity plagues the stream of commerce concept,
and it eventually forces courts to draw meaningless distinctions.”).
167. See Corr v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 713 P.2d 92, 95–96 (Wash. 1986) (refusing to apply
dual capacity doctrine where negligent predecessor would have been protected by exclusivity rule);
Braga v. Genlyte Grp., 420 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) (refusing to use merger statute as tool to increase,
rather than merely sustain continued existence, of corporate predecessor’s liabilities); Griffin, Inc. v.
Loomis, Fargo & Co., 979 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (arguing dual persona doctrine is
designed to prevent injustice, not create additional liabilities).
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the successor’s employee. If the two companies had never merged, the
employee would have a cause of action against the negligent manufacturer.
There is, however, some authority to support the proposition that the
predecessor’s immunities as an employer can affect those of the successor
via the “stream of commerce” argument. If the predecessor is a subscriber
under the Texas workers’ compensation scheme and only ever used the
defectively manufactured product in-house, the successor’s employee would
have been in no different position than an employee of the predecessor
vis-à-vis the exclusivity rule. Even though Texas courts could readily pursue
either approach to establish a relatively limited application of the dual
persona doctrine, the few Texas cases that have considered this scenario
refused to apply either method.
In the 1985 Texas case, Davis v. Sinclair Refining Co.,168 the Houston Court
of Appeals considered and rejected the plaintiff’s claim that his employer
should be held liable as the successor in interest.169 Sinclair Refining owned
and operated a refinery and made several modifications to the crude oil
distillation unit on site, including the installation of a carbon steel pipe
connection to a hot asphalt pump.170 However, the design called for a
different alloy.171 Sinclair Refining eventually merged into Arco in 1969.172
Shortly thereafter, Davis was hired by Arco and was injured on the job when
the carbon steel pipe connection to the asphalt pump broke free, covering
Davis in hot asphalt.173 Because the injury was work-related, Davis
received employment compensation benefits.174 Davis subsequently sued
Arco as Sinclair Refining’s successor in interest for the negligent installation
of the incorrect pump pipe.175
In only three pages, the Houston Court of Appeals wholly rejected the
argument that Arco should be responsible for Sinclair’s negligence, despite
assuming its liabilities under the Texas merger statute, summarily stating that
“[Davis] should not be allowed to use his employee status for purposes of
claiming benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, then attempt to

168. Davis v. Sinclair Refin. Co., 704 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
169. Id. at 414–16.
170. Id. at 414.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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distinguish that status for purposes of invoking the third-party tortfeasor
exception to the Act.”176
In a similar Texas case from 2009, Union Carbide Corporation v. Smith,177
the plaintiff-employee, Oliver Smith, was diagnosed with lung cancer caused
by repeated exposure to asbestos at his employer’s facility.178 Smith first
worked at the facility that caused his exposure to asbestos as an employee
for Smith-Douglas.179 Smith-Douglas was subsequently purchased by
Hexion.180 Smith continued on as an employee of Hexion after the merger,
and Hexion obtained workers’ compensation insurance for its
employees.181
The district court only allowed the plaintiff to proceed on his claims
against Hexion as successor in interest to Smith-Douglas for asbestos
exposure that occurred prior to the merger of the two companies.182
The Houston Court of Appeals reversed, however, opining that the
plaintiff’s claims were barred because Hexion was a subscriber under the
Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, and the plaintiff had been an employee
of both companies.183 But a cursory examination of the facts shows that
this does not paint the full picture.
Hexion may have been a subscriber under the workers’ compensation
statute—thus creating employer immunity—but Smith-Douglas was
not.184 This clearly implicates a dual persona scenario, because the plaintiff
could have sued Smith-Douglas as a non-subscribing employer unprotected
by the exclusive remedy provision.185 Therefore, Hexion should not be
allowed to retroactively apply its workers’ compensation insurance to a time
when it was not in force to circumvent its liabilities via the merger.
However, the appellate court reiterated Texas’s general rejection of any dual
176. Id. at 416.
177. Union Carbide Corp. v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet.
denied).
178. Id. at 373. Although this case is based on premises liability theory rather than product
defect theory, the employer’s inchoate liabilities as the successor corporation are the main point in
issue. Id. at 373, 378.
179. Id. at 379.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 381.
184. Brief for Appellee at 1, Union Carbide Corp. v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (No. 01-08-00641-CV), 2009 WL 994623.
185. Cf. Herbolsheimer v. SMS Holding Co., 608 N.W.2d 487, 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(suggesting the predecessor’s immunity essentially “transfers” to the successor).
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capacity or dual persona theory, simply stating, “[t]he ‘dual-persona’
doctrine has never been adopted by a Texas court as a means for imposing
liability on a subscribing employer and avoiding the exclusive remedy
provision of the Act.”186 As the next section will show, this is a recurring
theme in Texas cases that represents a simplistic response to a complex
issue.187
IV. LOOKING AT THE LONE STAR STATE
A. Judicial Precedent So Far
In the Texas Supreme Court case, Payne v. Galen Hospital Corporation,188
the plaintiff, formerly employed as a nurse at the defendant-hospital,
sustained an adverse reaction to a medication prescribed to her by an outside
physician for a work-related injury, and she thereafter sued the hospital as
the vendor/distributor of medication.189 Although the court ultimately
ruled that the dual capacity doctrine was inapplicable under these facts, it
made two notable points.190 First, the court implicitly refused to foreclose
future applications of dual capacity theory in different scenarios.191
Second, the court acknowledged the possibility that compensability under
the Workers’ Compensation Act may not automatically equate to exclusivity
of remedy.192 In fact, by this point in time, the Texas Supreme Court had
already decided another case which called into question the idea that dual
capacities or personas could never be implicated under the Workers’
Compensation Act.193
In the 1982 Texas Supreme Court case, Harris v. Casualty Reciprocal
Exchange,194 Paul Stone received a fatal gunshot wound while working as
186. Union Carbide Corp. v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 370, 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009,
pet. denied).
187. Kelly, supra note 2, at 833.
188. Payne v. Galen Hosp. Corp., 28 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. 2000).
189. Id. at 16–17.
190. Id. at 20–21.
191. See id. (“We have never decided whether an employee may use the dual-capacity doctrine
to avoid the Act’s exclusive-remedy provision. But even if we were inclined to recognize the doctrine,
which we do not decide, it does not apply here.”).
192. See id. at 19 (“Whether or not ‘compensability’ and ‘exclusivity’ are always and for all
purposes coextensive, which we do not decide, we hold that they are coextensive here.”).
193. See Harris v. Cas. Reciprocal Exch., 632 S.W.2d 714, 715 (Tex. 1982) (treating corporate
officer as employee for employment compensation purposes).
194. Harris v. Cas. Reciprocal Exch., 632 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1982).
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the interim night manager at the Green House, a club in Austin.195 Marju
Enterprises (Marju), for which Stone was also a corporate officer and
director, was doing business as the Green House.196 The executors of
Stone’s estate, the plaintiffs, brought suit against Marju’s insurance carrier,
Casualty Reciprocal Exchange (Casualty), claiming that Stone’s estate was
entitled to employment compensation benefits for the work-related
injury.197
Casualty responded that Stone, as corporate officer, was not covered
under Marju’s employment compensation insurance,198 and was thus not
entitled to compensation benefits.199 However, Stone was not acting in his
capacity as a corporate officer when the fatal injury occurred, but rather as
an employee—who would otherwise have been entitled to employment
compensation benefits under Marju’s insurance coverage.200 Therefore,
“[g]iven these facts,” the court summarily stated, “we hold that Stone was
an ‘employee’ at the time of his death and thereby came within the
provisions of the workers’ compensation act, and that the benefits sought
by his survivors should have been awarded.”201
Based on these two cases, it is clear that the Texas Supreme Court has
not completely disavowed dual capacity theory. However, the Texas
Appellate Courts are another matter. In Cohn v. Spinks Industries, Inc.,202 the
Dallas Court of Civil Appeals was unwilling to apply the dual capacity
doctrine for two principal reasons: (1) it circumvents the state legislature’s
intent that workers’ compensation benefits should exist in derogation of an
employee’s other common law remedies;203 and (2) extending such judicial
exceptions would all-but destroy the workers’ compensation scheme in
Texas.204 Since Cohn, every other intermediate appellate court in Texas that
has considered a dual capacity scenario used the same justifications for not
195. Id. at 714.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 715. The Texas Workers’ Compensation Law was revised in 1967 to make workers’
compensation insurance elective for corporate officers. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(a)
(1967).
199. Harris, 632 S.W.2d at 715.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 719.
202. Cohn v. Spinks Indus., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
203. See id. at 104 (suggesting legislative intent as primary reason why courts in other
jurisdictions refuse to apply dual capacity theory).
204. See id. (“To adopt the dual capacity doctrine would do considerable violence to the
statutory language.”).
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applying the doctrine.205 Therefore, the next section will address why the
reasons for declining to apply traditional dual capacity theory are not
implicated in the dual persona context.
B. Legislative Intent and Practical Implications
1.

Legislative Intent and Statutory Construction

There are two main starting points for statutory construction in Texas.
First, the courts will look to the plain meaning of the statute, as the statute’s
words are the best indicator of what the legislature intended.206 Second,
Texas courts presume that the legislature enacts new laws with complete
knowledge of other laws already in existence and force.207 Section 401.011
of the Texas Labor Code clearly defines an employer as “a person who
makes a contract of hire, employs one or more employees, and has workers’
compensation insurance coverage.”208 And pursuant to Section 408.001 of
the Texas Labor Code, subscribing employers are shielded from liability to
an employee for any work-related negligence by the employer.209 However,
third parties may still be held liable under the Texas Workers’ Compensation
Act.210
The traditional version of the dual capacity doctrine is limited in that it
does not separate the employer from the third party truly responsible for

205. See Holt v. Preload Tech., Inc., 774 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1989, no writ)
(opining legislative intent and negative impact preclude dual capacity’s use); Darensburg v. Tobey,
887 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied) (asserting compensation benefits are the only
intended remedy under WCA); Gore v. Amoco Prod. Co., 616 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1981, no writ) (explaining the intent of WCA is exclusiveness of remedy and adding
exceptions would harm employment compensation system as a whole); cf. Davis v. Sinclair Refin. Co.,
704 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (declining to apply dual
persona doctrine where legislature intended compensation benefits to be exclusive remedy); Union
Carbide Corp. v. Smith, 313 S.W.3d 370, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)
(arguing public policy prohibits using corporate merger statutes to circumvent exclusivity rule). But see
Burkett v. Welborn, 42 S.W.3d 282, 290 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (holding shareholder
of corporate employer could be sued in her capacity as landowner of premises where corporate
employee was injured).
206. In re Huag, 175 S.W.3d 449, 451 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
207. Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 414–15
(2012).
208. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.011(18).
209. Id. § 408.001(a).
210. Id. § 417.001(a).
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the employee’s injuries.211 Although many persons or corporations occupy
multiple differing obligations, there remains only one person or entity
responsible for them.212 And as Professor Larson suggests,
When one considers how many such added relations an employer might have
in the course of a day’s work—as landowner, land occupier, products
manufacturer, installer, modifier, vendor, bailor, repairman, vehicle owner,
shipowner, doctor, hospital, health services provider, self-insurer, safety
inspector—it is plain enough that this trend could go a long way toward
demolishing the exclusive remedy principle.213

This ultimately is what distinguishes the dual persona doctrine from its
predecessor. We are not required to resort to a judicially created fiction to
generate a separate liability,214 but can rather look to two—very real—
third-party scenarios created via the Texas Business Organizations Code.
There is no statute expressly establishing the separate legal status of a
corporation from its shareholders, but Texas courts presume this distinction
exists;215 otherwise the limited liability for shareholders generated by
Section 21.223 of the Business Organizations Code216 would be
meaningless. A shareholder is not usually treated as the corporate
employer,217 and absent the shareholder acting in a role which might create
immunity under the exclusive remedy provision,218 there is no genuine
conflict between these sections of the Texas Labor Code and Texas
Business Organizations Code. When there is no genuine issue between laws

211. See 10 LARSON, supra note 10, § 113.01 (“[A] single legal person may be said to have many
‘capacities,’ since that term has no fixed legal meaning.”).
212. See McAlister v. Methodist Hosp. of Memphis, 550 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. 1977)
(“The employer is the employer; not some person other than the employer. It is that simple.”).
213. 10 LARSON, supra note 10, § 113.01.
214. See id. (“[F]ictions have no place in the interpretation of detailed modern statutes, such as
compensation acts.”).
215. Richard Nugent & CAO, Inc. v. Estate of Ellickson, 543 S.W.3d 243, 266 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
216. See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.223(a) (“A holder of shares . . . may not be held
liable to the corporation or its obligees . . . .”).
217. Lind v. Barnes Tag Agency, Inc., 418 P.3d 698, 705 (Okla. 2018).
218. The doctrine of respondeat superior limits the extent to which an employer can be held
responsible for a co-employee’s negligence, but this also extends the limited immunity to a co-employee
under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. Arnold v. Gonzalez, No. 13-13-00440-CV,
2015 WL 5109757, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 28, 2015, pet. granted).
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requiring further statutory construction, they should be read together to give
full effect to their practical implications.219
In the case of corporate successor liability, there is an apparent conflict
that requires further analysis.
The merger requirements under
Section 10.008 of the Business Organization Code are specifically designed
to sustain the obligations and liabilities of merged corporations,220
otherwise every negligent corporation would simply dissolve into another to
offload any inchoate liabilities and deprive those injured of redress.221
Even though the employee would be required to sue his employer, the
employer would not be sued solely within the confines of the employment
relationship, but rather as the successor in interest to the corporation liable
for the employee’s injuries under the Texas merger statute. This is where
the dual persona doctrine can give effect to the purposes of both the state
merger law and exclusive remedy provision.222
“A third-party action should be no less viable because the duty owed by
the tortfeasor springs from an extra-relational [persona] of the employer
rather than arising from another third party.”223 The successor corporation
knew it could be susceptible to suit in tort for the inchoate liabilities of the
predecessor.224 When the Texas workers’ compensation scheme was first
enacted, the Legislature could hardly have anticipated the current level of
corporate consolidation and conglomeration.225 To allow an employer to
extinguish an employee’s statutorily afforded remedies against third parties,
via corporate merger, could not have been contemplated by the Legislature

219. See Beal, supra note 207, at 415 (“In the absence of an express repeal by statute, where there
is no positive repugnance between the provisions of the old and new statutes, the old and new statutes
will each be construed so as to give effect, if possible, to both statutes.”).
220. See Davis v. Sinclair Refin. Co., 704 S.W.2d 413, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (Sears, J., dissenting) (“It is clear that Texas law does not intend to let an injured
party be deprived of a cause of action merely because two corporations have merged.”).
221. See Matt Acosta, Comment, A Vanishing Remedy: Questioning the Constitutionality of the Current
State of Sale of Assets, Post-Dissolution Tort Liability in Texas, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 655, 656 (2008)
(discussing similar immunity for corporate asset purchases under Section 11.356 of the Texas Business
Organizations Code).
222. Stayton v. Clariant Corp., 10 A.3d 597, 602 (Del. 2010).
223. Kelly, supra note 2, at 832.
224. See Davis, 704 S.W.2d at 419 (Sears, J., dissenting) (comparing successor corporations’
voluntary indemnification to liability via merger).
225. See Note, Workers’ Compensation: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine, supra note 18, at 838 (arguing
rising conglomeration through corporate diversification should not automatically erase an employee’s
cause of action); Stayton, 10 A.3d at 602–3 (suggesting the voluntary merger of corporate entities is
independent of the employment relationship contemplated by state’s workers’ compensation scheme).
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in creating the Workers’ Compensation Act,226 and therefore should not be
permitted.227 Further still, the practical effect of extending such
protections would “cloak the employer with absolute immunity from
liability under any theory to an injured employee who is eligible for or has
received workers’ compensation[,] even though the liability asserted arises
outside the employment relationship.”228 Since it is far from clear that
either the Texas Legislature or the Texas Supreme Court would shut the
courthouse doors on the dual persona doctrine, we can now turn to the
second issue expressed by the Cohn court—the implications of the effects
of a dual persona doctrine on the workers’ compensation system in
Texas.229
2.

Implications of the Dual Persona Doctrine in Texas

It should come as no surprise that states which have applied the dual
persona version of dual capacity theory still have working employment
compensation programs. Neither have the courts in these states been
bombarded with a surge of new lawsuits based on the dual persona doctrine.
Similarly, we should not expect a substantial increase in Texas litigation for
two reasons: first, application of the dual persona doctrine is inherently
limited by the laws that create its existence; and second the effect of other
provisions in the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act prevent an employee’s
double recovery after receiving employment compensation benefits.
The dual persona doctrine is distinct from traditional dual capacity theory
in that the state legislature or common law have “already clearly recognized
duality of legal persons, so that it may be realistically assumed that a
legislature would have intended that duality to be respected.”230 In reality,
there are only so many personas which can claim such legal status.231 To
suggest, therefore, that this concept can be indiscriminately enlarged to
226. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 831–32 (“The plain intent of current compensation schemes is
to protect the employee for injuries which occur in the course of his employment while also preserving
his right to bring third-party actions.”).
227. An ultra-strict interpretation of the law should be avoided when it leads to outcomes
inconsistent with the true intent and purposes of the legislature in enacting it. Beal, supra note 207,
at 426.
228. Kimzey v. Interpace Corp., 694 P.2d 907, 912 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985).
229. Cohn v. Spinks Indus., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1980, writ ref’d
n.r.e.).
230. 10 LARSON, supra note 10, § 113.01.
231. See generally id. § 113.01–.02 (listing different scenarios where dual legal personalities can
reasonably be implicated, such as trustees, corporations, and shareholders).
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encompass every aspect of an employer’s existence—as was a main critique
of the dual persona doctrine’s predecessor—is mere unwarranted
speculation.
Even if Texas employees tried to expand the dual persona doctrine
beyond its reasonable applications, they would still have to contend with the
limitations in Section 417.002 of the Texas Labor Code. Section 417.002
requires that a subscribing employer be subrogated to the rights of the
employee for any amounts recovered from a third party up to the value of
the employment compensation benefits the employer’s insurance carrier
already paid to the injured employee.232 If the employer is treated as a third
party for dual persona purposes, the employee’s damages could simply be
offset by the value of employment compensation benefits already paid out.
Taking the Texas Business Organizations and Labor Codes to their logical
conclusion completely negates the issues prior courts had with dual capacity
theory and also protects the employee: (1) the employee is not deprived of
his standing to bring suit; (2) the employee is prevented from receiving
greater benefits than he would otherwise be entitled to if he were injured by
a third party; and (3) the employer is nearly always in no worse a position
than if the exclusive remedy provision was strictly construed.
V. CONCLUSION
A. The Dual Capacity Doctrine is Rejected as Unworkable
When an employer’s negligence causes an employee’s injury on the job,
the employee can normally bring suit to recover damages for the workrelated injury. But an employee who elects to receive employment
compensation benefits under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act is
barred from bringing suit against the negligent employer. However, there
are situations where an employee may be injured by an employer’s
negligence in duties that arise independent of the employment relationship,
such as a doctor’s negligent treatment of a patient who also happens to be
an employee. In such scenarios, it makes sense to hold the employer liable
for their violation of those independent obligations, notwithstanding the
exclusive remedy provision of the Act. Despite its logic, most states have
rejected the dual capacity doctrine as unworkable and in direct conflict with
232. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 417.002(a) (“The net amount recovered by a claimant in a thirdparty action shall be used to reimburse the insurance carrier for benefits, including medical benefits,
that have been paid for the compensable injury.”).
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the intent of most state legislatures that employment compensation benefits
be the exclusive remedy for an injured employee, regardless of an employer’s
various capacities. Additionally, most courts and commentators argue that
applying the dual capacity doctrine would completely destroy the workers’
compensation scheme, as most employers occupy multiple capacities daily.
However, its successor, the dual persona doctrine, is not saddled with the
same concerns.
B. The Dual Persona Doctrine is Possible and Practical
As this Comment has demonstrated, there are at least two dual personas
that can be used to circumvent the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas
Workers’ Compensation Act to hold an employer liable as a third party.
The Business Organizations Code generates the dual personas a shareholder
may hold, and there is no reason to believe the Texas Legislature intended
for a shareholder to be allowed to reverse pierce the corporate form and
receive both the benefits of limited liability as a shareholder and immunity
as a subscribing employer. In fact, at least one Texas court has already
applied the dual persona doctrine in this situation.
Similarly, there is no basis for the assertion that the Legislature intended
for the exclusive remedy provision to wholly eliminate the liabilities a
successor corporation readily takes on when it merges with a predecessor
corporation. And the fact that at least one Texas court acknowledged an
employer’s dual personas—by holding a shareholder liable as the owner or
occupier of land—should only increase support for application of other dual
personas which share similar statutorily created existences, such as the
liability of a successor corporation as the manufacturer or designer of a
defective product. Further, a court can apply these dual personas without
offending the general purposes behind the Texas Workers’ Compensation
Act.
C. The Dual Persona Doctrine Will Not Harm the Texas Workers’ Compensation
Act
The dual persona doctrine does not enlarge an employee’s chances of
recovery against an employer but simply preserves the employee’s right to
bring a tort cause of action. The dual persona doctrine is limited in that its
existence is only justified by the statutes in the Business Organizations Code
and in highly-entrenched common law distinctions that are, and have been,
recognized under Texas law for a significant period of time. Unlike with the
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dual capacity doctrine, there are only so many dual legal personalities that
maintain such elevated status. Therefore, it is unlikely that accepting the
dual persona doctrine in the limited instances addressed in this Comment
would substantially increase litigation between employers and employees.
And even if litigation were more aggressively pursued in expansion of the
doctrine beyond its reasonable bounds, employees would not be able to
obtain double recovery because of another provision in the Texas Labor
Code.
The Texas Labor Code requires an employer to be subrogated to the
compensation an employee recovers from a third party who caused the
work-related injury up to the value of the employment compensation
benefits already paid out by the employer’s insurance carrier. If we treat an
employer as a third party and allow the employee to bring suit under the
dual persona doctrine, then the employee can only recover damages in
excess of what they would have received in employment compensation
benefits. If the maximum amount of recovery is insignificant, it is highly
unlikely most employees would opt to take their chances in court rather than
receive definite employment compensation benefits.
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